


REQUEST FOR OR NOTIFICATION OF REGRADING ACTION For use of this form, see AR 380-5; the proponent agency is Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.		FILE	DATE 11 DEC 84		
NOTE: Read instructions on reverse side before completing this form.					
TO: (Include ZIP Code) Classification Review Division Office of Information Services Director of Administration 322 Ames Building Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505					
FROM: (Include ZIP Code) President, National Defense University. ATTN: Special Collections, NDU Library, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000					
<input type="checkbox"/> THE DOCUMENT(S) DESCRIBED BELOW HAS/HAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR REGRADING AND ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AS INDICATED. APPROPRIATE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO MARK YOUR COPIES AND NOTIFY ALL RECIPIENTS TO WHOM ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION WAS FURNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 380-5. DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THIS SAME SUBJECT SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR POSSIBLE REGRADING. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REQUEST DOCUMENT(S) DESCRIBED BELOW BE REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY CAN BE DOWNGRADED OR DECLASSIFIED AT THIS TIME. (Include justification in the Remarks Section of this form.) <input type="checkbox"/> REQUEST APPROPRIATE GROUP MARKINGS FOR DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED BELOW. <input type="checkbox"/> DOCUMENT(S) DESCRIBED BELOW HAS/HAVE BEEN PLACED IN A DIFFERENT GROUP AND WILL BE RE-MARKED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AR 380-5.					
CONTROL NUMBER <small>a</small>	DOCUMENTS <small>(Type, Headquarters of Origin, Date, Subject or Short Title)</small> <small>b</small>	CLAS OF SUBJ <small>c</small>	INCL <small>d</small>	CLAS AND GP NO. <small>e</small>	RE- GRADED TO CLAS & GP NO. <small>f</small>
SPCOL-TS 0051-84	Memo for Director of CIA dated 2 DEC 1965. (6 pages)	TS			
SPCOL-S 0082-84	Memo for Gen Taylor dated 1 July 1964 with Gen Taylor's reply attached. (4 pages)	S	1		
//////////// NOTHING FOLLOWS ////////////					
AUTHORITY OR COMMAND LINE (When applicable)					
Susan K. Lemke Special Collections Librarian <small>PRINTED OR TYPED NAME AND TITLE OF OFFICER</small>		 <small>SIGNATURE</small>			

DA FORM 1575

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 AUG 61, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

REMARKS

The enclosed documents have been requested by the Department of State for inclusion in the State Department's Foreign Relations Series.

ACTION TAKEN OR RECOMMENDED BY RECIPIENT

6 November 1985

CIA has reviewed the following documents which you forwarded on 11 December 1984, and which the Department of State wants to include in the Foreign Relations of the United States series:

1. Memorandum for the Director, from the Board of National Estimates, dated 2 December 1965, TS, Subj: "Reactions to a US Course of Action in Vietnam."
2. Memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, from the DCI, 1 July 1964, Subj: "CIA Operations in Vietnam," 1 July 1964, S, with two attachments:
 - a. Letter from Chairman, JCS, to the Deputy Director, CIA, 1 July 1964, S.
 - b. Letter from Deputy Director, CIA, to Chairman, JCS, 2 July 1964, S.

We are declassifying the three CIA items, and have no objection to their inclusion in FRUS. We have no objection to the declassification of 2a, the JCS item.

OIS/DA/CIA

STAT

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1. Prepare sufficient number of copies to furnish one copy to each addressee of the original document and one copy for retention. Entries on form may be printed in ink.

2. Care will be taken to completely identify the document(s) being regraded to prevent error by the recipient. All inclosures being regraded will be accounted for in the inclosure column. When covering document only is being regraded and there are inclosures (*classified or unclassified*) which are not being regraded, the symbol "n/c" will be entered in the inclosure column. The regrading form will contain unclassified information only. Short titles will consist of the first letter of each word in the subject or title except when a formal short title has been assigned.

3. The following symbols will be used (*for purposes of this form only*) to indicate the classification of the document(s) or portions thereof and protective marking to be affixed:

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(Indicate in parentheses the number of years from date of origin OF LUSE will be removed from document.)

4. When the document(s) will be regraded upon the occurrence of an event, the classification will be followed by an asterisk (*) and the event described on the bottom of the form or in "Remarks" above.

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SUBJECT:

Memo for the Director of Central Intelligence from Sherman Kent, Chairman of National Estimates, CIA, Subject: Reactions to a US Course of Action in Vietnam

CIA SOURCE INFORMATION ORIGINATOR		EXTERNAL SOURCE INFORMATION ORIGINATOR		
DIRECTORATE	OFFICE/BRANCH	AGENCY	CONTROL NUMBER	COPY NO.
DCI	ONE/Chairman	NDU	SPCOL-TS-0051-84	1 of

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TS# 185900d
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
mp3

2 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Reactions to a US Course of Action in Vietnam

THE PROBLEM: To estimate reactions, principally those of the Communists, to a stepped-up US effort in the Vietnamese war. The measures would include further troop commitments which would double or triple present US strength, bombing of DRV military and industrial targets hitherto spared, and the mining of DRV harbors.

1. Present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. The Communists recognize that the US reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination to avoid defeat. They expect more US troops and probably anticipate that targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area will come under air attack. Nevertheless, they remain unwilling to damp down the conflict or to move toward negotiation. They expect a long war, but they continue to believe that time is their ally and that their own staying power is superior.

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2. DRV Reactions to Air Strikes. We do not believe that the postulated air attacks, in themselves, would alter these Communist calculations. The DRV would not decide to quit; PAVN infiltration southward would continue. Damage from the strikes would make it considerably more difficult to support the war in the South, but these difficulties would neither be immediate nor insurmountable.

3. Chinese Reactions. China would encourage North Vietnam to persevere and would make strenuous efforts to help overcome the effect of the attacks, e.g., by sending more engineering and support units to North Vietnam. The Chinese would probably provide AAA units but probably not air cover over the DRV from Chinese bases. Almost certainly they would not permit the USSR to operate combat aircraft from Chinese bases.

4. Reactions to Mining. Peiping and Hanoi would try to keep a maximum amount of supplies moving in shallow-draft coastal shipping. The mining would also cause them to make intensive efforts to keep open the rail lines from China.

5. Soviet Reactions. The postulated attacks would probably not only destroy much of the military equipment supplied by the

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USSR but would greatly increase Soviet resupply problems. We believe that Soviet ships would avoid mined areas. Hence, almost of necessity, the volume of Soviet military and economic aid would decline. This would be a major frustration of Moscow's Vietnam policy; it would probably reduce Soviet influence in Hanoi, and it would certainly increase the deterioration in Soviet-US relations.

6. Free World Reactions. Mining would be offensive to most non-Communist nations, particularly to maritime states such as the UK and Norway. The action would be widely criticized, but Free World shipping would avoid mined areas. The combinations of wider air strikes and mining would greatly increase public manifestations of opposition to the US, generate condemnatory efforts in the UN, and make it more difficult to retain foreign government support for the US effort in Vietnam. Widespread apprehension that a wider war was becoming inevitable would markedly increase pressures on the US to negotiate.

7. Reactions to More US Troops. The DRV almost certainly is preparing additional PAVN units for dispatch to the South. We see little chance that, upon learning of US intentions to augment its forces, Hanoi would decide to damp down the war.

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Rather than conclude in advance that the tide of battle would turn permanently against them, the Communists would choose to boost their own commitment and to test US capabilities and will to persevere at a higher level of conflict and casualties. Thus the DRV reaction would probably be a larger program of PAVN infiltration.

8. Longer-Term Reactions. If the US were willing to commit enough forces -- and we cannot say how much would be "enough" -- it could ultimately prevent the DRV/VC from sustaining the conflict at a significant level. When this point was reached, while they could perhaps simply revert to a low level of small-unit actions, they might believe it necessary to make a more fundamental choice between resorting to political tactics or enlarging the war. We believe that it would take a prolonged period of military discouragement to convince the DRV and the VC, persuaded as they are of their inherent advantages, that they had reached such a pass.

9. If this point were reached, Chinese influence would weigh heavily in the DRV's decision. Chinese military intervention would be needed to enlarge the war in an effective way. If this were not forthcoming, the DRV would perforce have to resort

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primarily to political tactics, perhaps continuing harassments and sabotage at a low level. If the Chinese were willing to intervene and enlarge the war, however, the DRV regime would fear the ultimate loss of its independence whatever the final outcome. But China might at this point regard its stakes as so high that it would overbear any reluctance in Hanoi to its intervention. The USSR for its part would argue against this course and probably warn Hanoi to expect no Soviet assistance.

10. Prudence would seem to dictate that Hanoi and Peiping should choose at this stage to reduce the effort in the South, perhaps negotiate, and salvage their resources for another day. We think that the chances are a little better than even that this is what they would do. But their ideological and emotional commitment, and the high political stakes involved, persuade us that there is an almost equal chance that they would do the opposite, that is, enlarge the war and bring in large numbers of Chinese forces. They have made certain preparations which could point in this direction. This latter course would imply that China disbelieved in US willingness to use nuclear weapons, discounted

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their effectiveness, or both. We can by no means rule out such attitudes in Peiping.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

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
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

2 July 1964



General Maxwell D. Taylor
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Taylor:

Following up on your letter of 1 July in response to my memorandum of the same date, and your phone call this morning, I want to assure you that the only actions we have taken have been to exchange views with Peer deSilva in Saigon who, in turn, has had an exploratory discussion with Alexis Johnson. We have alerted some of our old South Vietnamese hands, but have not moved any people at all.

I am sorry if we gave you the impression of making an end run--this was certainly not the intention since I wrote to you, and only to you, and you are the coach, the captain, and the quarterback of the team.

We will continue to make suggestions wherever we feel we can be helpful. I can assure you that the assets of the Agency are at your disposal. You need only to tell us how you would like us to help.

Faithfully yours,



Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA

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